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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Globalization of capital is not a new problem, but it is a persistent and growing one. Capital's 
ability to search the world over for the cheapest labor enables corporations to maintain oppressive 
working conditions and leads to downward pressures on living and working standards throughout the 
world. U.S. coal miners and their union, the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), realized many years 
ago that waging struggles in this country was not enough to successfully deal with the reality of job and 
capital flight to repressive, low-wage countries. 
Just using the old methods won't work anymore. We must also join forces across industry lines and 
national boundaries if we want to be successful. And we must come up with new and creative means to 
confront corporate power. But it often takes years of developing relationships and working together to 
develop the close bonds and trust that are necessary for effective solidarity. The UMWA has been forging 
these bonds with the Colombian mine workers' union, Sindicato de los Trabajadores del Intercor 
(SlNTERCOR), since 1988. 
Forging alliances is only half the work of effective international solidarity. Unions also need 
comprehensive strategies that attack corporations from every possible angle. Only by employing an 
arsenal of different approaches can we ever hope to confront a multinational corporation as huge and 
powerful as Exxon. 
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Labor Solidarity 
In the New 
World Order 
The UMWA Program in Colombia 
• Kenneth S. Zinn 
"Capitalism is in business for profit and wherever it is going to realize 
the most profit out of human blood there it is going." 
- Mother Jones, 1911 convention of the UMWA 
Globalization of capital is not a new problem, but it is a persistent and 
growing one. Capital's ability to search the world over for the cheapest 
labor enables corporations to maintain oppressive working conditions 
and leads to downward pressures on living and working standards through-
out the world. U.S. coal miners and their union, the United Mine 
Workers of America (UMWA), realized many years ago that waging 
struggles in this country was not enough to successfully deal with the 
reality of job and capital flight to repressive, low-wage countries. 
Exxon Corporation, the second-largest company in the world, is an 
example of a U.S. energy producer which operates globally. With revenues 
of $101 billion, Exxon surpasses the economic power of most countries 
in the world. Although headquartered in the United States, Exxon's 
operations in 80 other countries pull in 78 percent of its revenues. Thus, 
even if Exxon's entire workforce in the United States - from the oil 
wells to the refineries to the chemical factories to the coal mines -
• Ken Zinn is the Special Projects Coordinator of the United Mine Workers of America. 
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joined forces in solidarity, only 22 percent of the revenues of the com-
pany would be affected. It's clear that in the case of such a company, 
international labor solidarity is not a luxury, it's essential. 
How can we as workers hope to have any influence over this corpo-
rate goliath or any other multinational corporation? How can we 
protect the interests of our members when it comes to wages, health 
care, pensions, health and safety, and dignity on the job? And how do 
we confront the reality of job and capital flight to repressive, low-wage 
countries? 
Just using the old methods won't work anymore. We must also join 
forces across industry lines and national boundaries if we want to be 
successful. And we must come up with new and creative means to 
confront corporate power. But it often takes years of developing 
relationships and working together to develop the close bonds and trust 
that are necessary for effective solidarity. The UMWA has been forg-
ing these bonds with the Colombian mine workers' union, Sindicato 
de los Trabajadores del Intercor (SlNTERCOR), since 1988. 
Forging alliances is only half the work of effective international sol-
idarity. Unions also need comprehensive strategies that attack corpo-
rations from every possible angle. Only by employing an arsenal of 
different approaches can we ever hope to confront a multinational cor-
poration as huge and powerful as Exxon. 
A STATE OF THE ART MINE CLOSES IN THE U.S. 
AND OPENS IN COLOMBIA 
In 1979 Exxon opened a $50 million mine in Wayne County, West 
Virginia, saying there was at least 40 years of work at the operation. But 
just four years later, Exxon closed it down and opened El Cerrejon, a 
mine in Colombia. The closing left miners like Terry Ramey of UMWA 
Local Union 2423 high and dry. 
"I was proud to serve my country in the military," Ramey, a bronze-
star Vietnam veteran, told the UMW journal in 1985, "and proud to be 
a coal miner and a UMWA member. And when Exxon opened the Mon-
terey mine, I saw it as a chance to provide some security for my family. 
Isn't that what America's all about?" 
"Then Exxon opened a mine in South America," Ramey continued. 
"That's where my job went. Now, I've been out of work for two years 
and I can't even get welfare or food stamps." 
Since the closing of the West Virginia mine, El Cerrejon has con-
tinued to expand its production and Exxon has sold off more North Amer-
ican holdings. Today, all that's left of Exxon's coal operations in North 
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America are two mines in Illinois, Monterey Coal #1 and #2, where 
about 800 UMWA miners are employed. 
In the meantime, production at Exxon's Cerrejon mine, and in Colom-
bia generally, is steadily increasing. Colombia now exports more than 
19 million tons of coal per vear, soon to be increased to 29 million tons. 
This may seem like small potatoes compared to a U.S. industry which 
produced over one billion tons of coal last year. But coal imports in the 
U.S. have grown by 284 percent over the last decade (with Colombian 
coal imports growing by 465 percent over that same period). In the 
export market, coal produced in low-wage, repressive countries like 
Colombia is taking a larger and larger share. As a result, total U.S. exports 
have declined by 24 percent in the last decade and thousands of U.S. 
coal mining jobs have been lost. 
A LOW-WAGE MINE OPENS IN COLOMBIA 
Jointly owned by Exxon Corporation and Carbocol, a Colombian 
government parastatal (state-held company), El Cerrejon is the largest 
export coal mine in the world. Exxon manages the mine through its wholly-
owned subsidiary, International Colombia Resources Corporation 
(Intercor). While U.S. mining jobs plummeted, the U.S. Export-Import 
Bank, a U.S. government agency, provided crucial financing totaling 
$565 million for the construction of the mine. 
"/ was proud to serve my country in the military and proud to 
be a coal miner and a UMWA member. Now, I've been out of 
work for fwo years and / can't even get welfare or food stamps/' 
Last year, El Cerrejon produced 13.6 million tons of coal, all for the 
export market. The coal from this mine is burned in power plants 
throughout Europe and here in the United States at utilities such as 
New England Power Co., Jacksonville Electric Authority, Public Service 
Electric & Gas, Northeast Utilities, and Public Service Co. of New 
Hampshire. But under what conditions is the coal for these plants 
obtained? 
In Colombia the labor movement has struggled against intense repres-
sion and the on-going gross violations of human rights. According to 
Amnesty International, political violence has claimed 20,000 lives in 
Colombia since 1986. And, contrary to the widespread belief in the U.S. 
that most of these murders are drug related, Amnesty estimates that 
only a very small percentage of the killing is due to narcotics trafficking. 
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Most of the victims, according to the human rights group, "are defense-
less peasants, cut down in the army's drive to crush Colombia's guerilla 
movements." To give but one gruesome example of how the killings are 
not limited to combatants, it is estimated that in 1993, 2,190 children, 
an average of six per day, were murdered in Colombia. 
Of course, the Colombian power elite perceive those engaged in 
union organizing as among the biggest threats to the status quo. The 
Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT) labor confederation reported 
last year that 1,020 of its members have been killed since the organi-
zation was formed at the end of 1986. During 1992 alone, 170 union 
activists were killed in Colombia - the highest number of any country in 
the world. 
It is in this environment that SlNTERCOR is attempting to best rep-
resent the 4,000 workers at the El Cerrejon coal mine in La Guajira 
province in the northeast corner of Colombia. Ironically, Exxon origi-
nally created SlNTERCOR in 1983, but unfortunately for the company, 
the workers were not content with a company union and in 1985 suc-
ceeded in severing the company's control. 
The conditions under which Colombian worker's labor require a 
strong independent union. For example, unsafe mining conditions 
claimed the lives of 14 workers in El Cerrejon's first 11 years of opera-
tion. And today workers still do not have the right to stop work if they 
believe conditions are unsafe. 
The first two rounds of bargaining between Exxon and SlNTERCOR 
in 1986 and 1988 ended with military intervention. While limited gains 
were made in each new contract, by 1988 Colombian miners were earn-
ing only $0.95 per hour. 
UMWA GETS INVOLVED IN INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN 
After the 1988 strike, the UMWA sent a delegation from its Illinois 
District 12 to Colombia. After learning about the situation first-hand, 
the UMWA vowed to step up its solidarity efforts for the 1990 round 
of bargaining at El Cerrejon. The union leadership understood that the 
fate of the Colombian mine workers and UMWA were intertwined. 
UMWA President Richard Trumka explained, "Our goal is to strengthen 
unions in low-wage countries so they are strong enough to fight for 
decent wages and working conditions to raise their standard of living 
up to our level. If we don't, the multinational corporations will attempt 
to lower our standards to the lowest international common denominator." 
(For a related story on global labor standards, see Lance Compa's article 
"And the Twain Shall Meet?" p. 51.) 
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As had occurred in previous rounds, negoti-
ations between Exxon and SlNTERCOR col-
lapsed in March 1990. To increase U.S. 
awareness of Exxon's horrendous labor 
practices, the UMWA sponsored a whirl-
wind solidarity tour by SlNTERCOR's Vice Pres-
ident Walter Castillo. Mr. Castillo arrived 
in the U.S. on the day before the Colombia 
union began a strike. 
He met with an unusually broad range of peo-
ple who could influence or were affected by the struggle in Colombia. 
In Illinois, Castillo met with UMWA locals from the two Exxon mines; 
in Houston he addressed Exxon shareholders and met CEO Lawrence 
Rawl. As Castillo remarked, "It isn't every day when a striking coal miner 
from Latin America gets to confront the CEO of a $101 billion multi-
national corporation." 
But it was a meet ing in Wash ing ton , D.C. with the UMWA's 
international executive board that "upped the ante" for cross-border 
solidarity. After hearing about the plight of Colombian mine workers, 
the union commit ted to providing crucial support for SlNTERCOR, 
including: 
• Securing thousands of dollars in funds to help support the Colom-
bian mine workers. 
• Meeting with some of Exxon's largest investors to explain how their 
dollars were linked to labor rights abuses. 
• Working with the Danish union confederation to pressure Danish 
utility companies importing coal from Colombia to put the heat 
on Exxon. 
Unfortunately, these efforts were not sufficient to stave off the com-
bined power of Exxon and the Colombian government. In May 1990, 
800 armed soldiers entered the mine with armored tanks, and the pres-
ident of Colombia ordered the miners back to work. Despite these pres-
sures, SlNTERCOR was able to reach a new agreement that included wage 
increases and a program to allow miners to purchase their own homes. 
The Colombian military response to the miners' strike brought the 
UMWA to the realization that simply waiting until a strike occurred 
was not effective solidarity work. So U M W A officials, along with 
SlNTERCOR and the Miners Internat ional Federat ion (MIF) , the 
international trade union secretariat representing miners worldwide, 
began planning a pro-active campaign to assist SlNTERCOR in prepara-
tion for the 1992 round of bargaining. 
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A NEW LEVEL OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZING 
The UMWA committed to bringing a wide array of weapons to bear 
against Exxon between 1990 and 1994. Its strategic campaign marked 
a new level of commitment in its cross-border solidarity campaign. 
• UMWA filed a Generalized System of Preference petition. 
The UMWA joined with the human rights group America's Watch 
to submit a petition to U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills. Under 
the law, the U.S. Trade Representative can deny GSP benefits to 
countries which violate "internationally recognized worker rights." 
Despite the fact that the petition cited over 46 selected cases of fla-
grant labor rights abuses in Colombia, including murder by death 
squads, the Bush Administration refused to grant even a hearing 
on the petition. 
• MIF held an inter-American union solidarity conference. 
In July 1991, the MIF held its first inter-American miners confer-
ence in almost 40 years in Bogota. Officials from the UMWA, and 
miners unions from Guyana and Chile, which represents copper 
miners at an Exxon mine in that country, toured El Cerrejon and 
met with SlNTERCOR officials. 
• MIF officials pressured Colombian government officials. 
While in Bogota, MIF General Secretary Peter Michalzik met with 
the Colombian Minister of Energy and Mines and the Minister of 
Labor. In those meetings, the ministers agreed to look into the 
industrial relations practices at El Cerrejon, acknowledging that 
international labor standards should be observed and that armed 
troops should not be used in industrial disputes. 
• UMWA set up cross-border training. 
The president of SlNTERCOR, Rafael Velasquez, came to the United 
States for extensive strategy discussions and training on negotia-
tions, strikes and corporate campaigns. 
• Mine worker officials around the world pressured Ambassadors. 
MIF officials met with the Colombian ambassador in Brussels; Aus-
tralian union officials met with the ambassador in Canberra; and 
UMWA officials met with the ambassador in Washington, D.C. 
Through these meetings the Colombian government was warned 
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not to repeat the experience of 1990 by deploying troops at the 
mine and allowing Exxon to fire union officials. 
• UMWA and SiNTERCOR workers declared cross border solidarity. 
UMWA miners at the Exxon mines in Illinois began wearing hat 
stickers on the job declaring their support for SiNTERCOR. Soon 
after, SiNTERCOR miners began sporting the same stickers on their 
hard hats at El Cerrejon. 
• UMWA and MIF initiated a letter writing campaign. 
Exxon received letters from the China Light & Power Co. Work-
ers' Free Union in Hong Kong, the United Mine Workers of Aus-
tralia, Exxon petrochemical workers in Europe, the Oil, Chemical 
& Atomic Workers and the AFL-CIO in the U.S., and the Inter-
national Federation of Chemical, Energy and General Workers 
Unions. Human rights groups such as the Colombia Human Rights 
Network and the Washington Office on Latin America communi-
cated their concern to the Colombian government and the U.S. 
State Department. 
• UMWA and U.S. elected officials applied diplomatic pressure. 
At the UMWA's request, both Senator Christopher Dodd, chair-
man of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the U.S. Sen-
ate, and Rep. Robert Torricelli, chairman of the Western Hemisphere 
Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives, sent letters 
to Colombian President Cesar Gaviria Trujillo urging that worker 
rights be respected at the mine and that the government refrain from 
deploying the armed forces. 
• UMWA was in Colombia during negotiations. 
UMWA Secretary-Treasurer Jerry Jones held a press conference on 
February 10, 1992 in Barranquilla, Colombia, the day before nego-
tiations were due to begin. "We're here to help SiNTERCOR prepare 
for negotiations, to advise them during their contract talks and, if 
necessary, assist them in any strike action," said Jones. 
Company officials were furious at the UMWA's presence in Colom-
bia, refusing to meet with SiNTERCOR if the North American miners 
were present. They also expressed their anger at the pressure they were 
receiving from Bogota as a result of the letters sent by Senator Dodd 
and Congressman Torricelli to President Gaviria. 
42 Labor Research Review #23 
Strip mining at Colombia's El Cerrejon mine. 
SUCCESS IN 1992 AND 1994 
The campaign clearly had an impact. In just a few short weeks, the 
union and the company reached an agreement that included a 29 per-
cent wage increase the first year and a 23 percent wage increase the sec-
ond year. In addition, the new contract provided for a 50 percent increase 
in housing as well as vacation and Christmas pay extended from 23 to 
26 days. Exxon also promised not to fire workers without a hearing that 
includes union participation. Perhaps even more important, for the first 
time ever, SlNTERCOR and Exxon reached a new agreement without a 
strike, without any union officials getting fired and without the deploy-
ment of armed troops. 
"We got what we wanted," said SlNTERCOR president Velasquez. 
The UMWA, MIF and SlNTERCOR continued their multi-pronged 
campaign strategy, which included an international conference of 
mineworkers from 21 countries in Las Vegas on October 12, 1993. Fol-
lowing the conference, Colombian, Chilean, and Australian minework-
ers traveled to Illinois and lent their support to striking mineworkers. 
Back in Colombia, the 1994 round of negotiations came off more 
smoothly than in 1992. The resulting agreement provided for a 24.5 
percent wage increase during the first year, and a 20 percent increase 
in the second year. In addition, for the first time, SlNTERCOR won its 
demand for a democratically-elected mine health and safety commit-
tee chosen by the miners. (This committee is now engaged in a UMWA-
MIF training program). Once again, SlNTERCOR and Exxon were able 
to reach an agreement without a strike, without the use of troops and 
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without the company firing any of the union's negotiators in what 
appeared to be a maturing of the collective bargaining relationship. 
PLENTY OF WORK LEFT TO DO 
The successes achieved during negotiations in 1992 and 1994 prove 
that international alliances and solidarity can be effective. It's clear that 
multinational corporations are vulnerable to international pressure. In 
just the last three rounds of bargaining at El Cerrejon, miners have 
increased their wages by more than 150 percent. Although Colombian 
miners' wages are still deplorably low - about $3.32 per hour - these 
recent gains show that progress can be made and the wage gap between 
the North and South can be narrowed. Thus, only by maintaining an 
activist and global approach to labor solidarity will the labor movement 
be able to stop the corporate exploitation of workers in repressive, low-
wage countries and resist the consequent downward pressure on living 
standards in the U.S. 
While international solidarity efforts are clearly having an effect at 
the bargaining table, Exxon's labor practices still leave much to be 
desired. Prior to the 1994 negotiations, the company fired hundreds of 
miners, including 18 
union officials. During 
negotiations, SlNTERCOR 
was unable to achieve a 
grievance procedure for 
dismissals or third party 
arbitration of disputed 
firings. After negotia-
tions and to this day, 
Exxon continues to fire 
union members and offi-
cials without due process. 
Nonetheless, the min-
ers and their communi-
ties steadfastly refuse to 
be intimidated by cor-
porate firing, and the 
UMWA remains com-
mitted to supporting the 
Colombian workers in 
their struggle. • 
SINTERCOR worker on the job. 
